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Computer Bulletin Board Operator Liability for Users' 
Infringing Acts 
M. David Dobbins 
INTRODUCTION 
As computer technology has advanced and become less expen-
sive, its role in modem society has become increasingly important. 
One effect of this development is the growth in popularity of com-
puter bulletin boards.1 A computer bulletin board does exactly 
what its name implies - it allows users to post and read electronic 
messages by accessing a central computer via phone lines.2 The 
content of an electronic message can be of the sort that would be 
found on a physical bulletin board,3 such as a message concerning 
the time and location of a meeting, but may also consist of 
software,4 digitized music,5 scanned pictures,6 or other information 
capable of being stored and interpreted by a computer.7 Users post 
messages on the bulletin board through a process called uploading 
and receive information from the bulletin board through a process 
called downloading. s 
Computer bulletin boards vary widely in volume of usage and 
purpose. Almost everyone has heard of the large online services 
like America Online, Prodigy, and CompuServe, which provide ac-
1. See Eric Schlachter, Cyberspace, the Free Market and the Free Marketplace of Ideas: 
Recognizing Legal Differences in Computer Bulletin Board Functions, 16 HAS11NGS CoMM. & 
ENT. L.J. 87, 90 {1993) {describing computer bulletin board technology as "occupying an 
increasingly important role in today's mass communications"). 
2. See generally Jay R. McDaniel, Note, Electronic Torts and Videotext - at the Junction 
of Commerce and Communications, 18 RUTGERS CoMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 773, 781 (1992) 
{describing modem technology). 
3. See David J. Loundy, E-Law: Legal Issues Affecting Computer Information Systems 
and Systems Operator Liability, 3 ALB. LJ. Sa. & TECH. 79, 82 (1993). 
4. See Louise Kehoe, Illegal Software Merchant Hit, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1992, at World 
Trade News 6 {describing a raid on thirteen bulletin board operations in Berlin that were 
distributing software illegally via computer bulletin boards). 
5. See Irv Lichtman, Pubs' Suit is Opening Salvo in War Over Computers, C'rights, BILL-
BOARD, Dec. 11, 1993, at 10 (discussing a suit filed against CompuServe for distributing digi-
tized copies of a copyrighted song via computer bulletin board). 
6. See Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 {M.D. Fla. 1993) (suit against bulletin 
board operator for distributing digitized copies of copyrighted photographs). See generally 
Benjamin R. Seecof, Comment, Scanning Into the Future of Copyrightable Images: 
Computer-Based Image Processing Poses a Present Threat, 5 HIGH TECH. L.J. 371, 373-77 
(1990) {discussing technology used to convert pictures into digitized images). 
7. See Dan L. Burk, Patents in Cyberspace: Territoriality and Infringement on Global 
Computer Networks, 68 Tur.. L. REv. 1, 14 (1993) {describing the content of electronic 
messages). 
8. Loundy, supra note 3, at 84 n.12. 
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cess not only to bulletin boards but also to online shopping, elec-
tronic ~ersions of newspapers and magazines, and electronic mail. 
In addition, many smaller, locally run bulletin boards cater to more 
specialized interests.9 Both large, online services and smaller, local 
bulletin boards have continued to grow in popularity. There are 
over four million users of the major online services, and individuals 
are setting up small, locally based bulletin boards every day.10 
Another aspect of the growth in bulletin board technology is the 
Internet. The Internet is a collection of independently operated lo-
cal and regional computer networks11 connected through common 
procedures by which they address and route computer data.12 
Through the Internet, users can gain access to vast quantities of in-
formation13 and exchange various forms of data, for example, com-
puter software.14 Current estimates indicate that there are around 
twenty-five million users of the Internet in thirty-three countries 
who are served by over seven hundred and fifty thousand independ-
ent host operators.15 Current estimates indicate that these numbers 
are increasing rapidly.16 
Bulletin board technology, with its ability to disperse vast quan-
tities of information quickly,17 has created a communications 
revolution.18 The increase in popularity of bulletin boards, how-
ever, has also multiplied the opportunities for abuse of the technol-
ogy. illegal distribution of copyrighted materials on computer 
bulletin boards has become a serious problem. High quality digi-
tized pictures, digitized music, ~d software are all capable of being 
uploaded and downloaded from computer bulletin boards, 19 and 
9. See Local Computer Bulletin Boards Hum, PROVIDENCE J. Buu .. , Aug. 18, 1994, at Dl 
(describing bulletin boards devoted to gay and lesbian issues); see also Colin O'Connel, Peo-
ple Can Investigate Religions From Comfort of Homes, OTTAWA CmZEN, Sept. 24, 1994, at 
CS (describing bulletin board devoted to religious issues). 
10. Local Computer Bulletin Boards Hum, supra note 9, at Dl. 
11. These networks in tum consist of many separate bulletin board operators who are 
referred to as hosts. 
12. Burk, supra note 7, at 8. 
13. Id. at 15. 
14. Bruce Schneier, What is Happening to the Internet?, MAcWEEK, Apr. 27, 1992, at 26. 
15. Daniel P. Dem, Applying the Internet, BYTE, Feb. 1992, at 111, 111; Schneier, supra 
note 14, at 24. 
16. Current estimates are that hosts linked to the Internet increase at a rate of about 
twenty to thirty percent a year. The Fruitfu~ Tangled Trees of Knowledge, EcoNOMIST, June 
20-26, 1992, at 85, 86. Additionally, Internet usage is increasing at a rate of about 15% a 
year. Local Computer Bulletin Boards Hum, supra note 9, at Dl. 
17. See Burk, supra note 7, at 13. 
18. See id. at 3-4. 
19. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text. 
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users of bulletin boards have employed the technology to exchange 
a wide variety of copyrighted materials.20 
Although it is clear that users who upload and download copy-
righted materials without the permission of the copyright owners 
violate U.S. copyright law, it is unclear whether bulletin board op-
erators are liable for the copyright infringement committed by 
users. Courts are just now beginning to grapple with this difficult 
issue,21 and no clear consensus has developed on how to handle the 
problem. 
Three distinct interests are involved in the resolution of this is-
sue. First, copyright owners wish to preserve the integrity of their 
statutory monopoly against the challenges of new technology. Sec-
ond, computer bulletin board operators have an interest in preserv-
ing the viability and growth of bulletin board technology and wish 
to avoid potentially prohibitive liability. Third, society at large 
seeks to accommodate the growth of useful new technologies and to 
encourage creative enterprises. 
This Note argues that a computer bulletin board operator's lia-
bility for copyright infringement by users of the bulletin board 
should be analyzed under the theory of contributory copyright in-
fringement. This Note calls for a standard of liability under contrib-
utory copyright infringement that accommodates the competing 
interests at stake in the resolution of this issue. Part I provides an 
overview of copyright infringement law and argues that in most sit-
uations the operator's actions, viewed independently, do not consti-
tute copyright infringement. Part II explores theories of third-party 
liability. This Part rejects the doctrine of vicarious liability as an 
effective means for establishing bulletin board operator liability and 
argues that contributory copyright infringement theory provides a 
more solid foundation for finding operator liability. Part III then 
proposes that courts employ a negligence standard to analyze con-
tributory copyright infringement claims against bulletin board 
operators. 
I. OVERVIEW OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND .APPLICATION 
OF DIRECT INFRINGEMENT ANALYSIS 
In order to determine whether a computer bulletin board opera-
tor is liable for the uploading and downloading of copyrighted ma-
terial on her bulletin board, a court must first determine whether 
20. See, e.g., Michael Meyer & Anne Underwood, Crimes of the 'Net', NEWSWEEK, Nov. 
14, 1994, at 46 (describing the problem of computer software piracy on the Internet). See 
generally EDWARD A. CAVAZOS & GAVINO MORIN, CYBERSPACE AND THE LAW 56-64 
(1994) (describing copyright issues regarding computer bulletin boards). 
21. See, e.g., Sega Enters. v. Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Playboy Enters. 
v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993). 
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the operator's actions have directly infringed on the rights of a 
copyright owner or whether a theory of third-party liability must be 
applied. This inquiry, unfortunately, is not always an easy task as 
the line dividing direct and indirect infringement has become some-
what fuzzy.22 The choice between direct and indirect infringement 
is important, however, because it determines the standard of liabil-
ity. For example, under a theory of direct infringement, a plaintiff 
need not prove that the defendant had knowledge that his activity 
constituted infringement,23 while under some theories of third-party 
liability, knowledge of the infringement is a required element.24 
Section I.A provides an overview of copyright infringement law 
and situations in which direct and third-party theories of liability 
are applicable. Section I.B argues that a bulletin board operator 
who does not herself engage in uploading or downloading of copy-
righted material is not directly infringing a copyright, and thus 
courts must apply a theory of third-party liability in order to find a 
bulletin operator liable in this situation. 
A. Copyright Infringement Law 
Section 106 of the Copyright Act of 197625 gives copyright own-
ers five distinct rights: 1) copying of the copyrighted work; 2) pre-
paring derivative works; 3) distributing copies of the work; 4) 
performing the work publicly; and 5) displaying the work publicly.26 
Section 501 of the Copyright Act prohibits a person who is not the 
copyright owner from engaging in any of the enumerated activities 
under threat of civil liability as a direct infringer.21 
An individual who engages in one of the prohibited activities is 
a direct infringer and may be liable to the copyright owner for 
either direct damages and profits arising out of the infringing use28 
or, alternatively, damages specified by the statute.29 For example, if 
22. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 n.17 {1984) (noting 
the lack of clarity in the application of theories of direct infringement, contributory infringe-
ment, and vicarious liability). 
23. See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 998-99 {2d Cir. 
1983) (endorsing the principle that an individual can be a direct infringer even if copying is 
done subconsciously); see also 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
CoPYRIGHr § 13.08 (1995). 
24. See Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 
(2d Cir. 1971) {"One who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or mate-
rially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory' 
infringer." (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)). 
25. This act is codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1988). 
26. 17 u.s.c. § 106 {1988). 
27. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1988); see also Pinkham v. Sara Lee Corp., 983 F.2d 824, 829 {8th Cir. 
1992) (describing activities constituting direct infringement). See generally 2 NIMMER & NIM· 
MER, supra note 23, § 8 {discussing the elements of copyright). 
28. 17 u.s.c. § 504(b) (1988). 
29. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) {1988). 
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a person puts on a musical which includes performances of copy-
righted songs, that person will be liable to the copyright owner for 
the profits from the performance that are attributable to the in-
fringement and for the loss in market value of the copyrighted work 
due to the infringement.30 
If a court finds that an individual did not herself engage in one 
of the activities enumerated in section 106, she may still be liable 
for copyright infringement under a theory of third-party liability.31 
Theories of third-party liability make people who are not them-
selves engaging in infringing activities liable for copyright infringe-
ment based on their connection to another person's violation.32 For 
example, if the owner of a night club hires a band as an independ-
ent contractor to perform live music and the band performs a copy-
righted piece of music without the copyright owner's permission, 
the band violates the performance right of the copyright owner and 
hence is a direct infringer.33 However, the owner of the bar who 
hired the band has not acted in violation of the copyright owner's 
section 106 rights because hiring a band is not within the activities 
prohibited by the statute. Therefore, the owner's liability will not 
rest on a direct violation of the statute but rather on his relation to 
the infringing party and the act of infringement. 34 In contrast, if the 
owners of a bar or their agents play a piece of recorded music in the 
bar without the permission of the copyright owner, they are cor-
rectly labeled as "direct" infringers because they have directly vio-
lated the owner's section 106 "performance" right,3s 
30. See generally Frank Music Corp. v. MGM, Inc., 772 F.2d 505, 512-20 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(discussing proper application of damages for copyright infringement). For an example of 
the application of statutory damages, see Engel v. Wild Oats, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1089, 1091-92 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
31. See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 23, § 12.04[A](2][b] n.65 (criticizing a court for 
using the term "direct liability theory" when a theory of third-party liability was being 
applied). 
32. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984) (describing 
the application of third-party liability for copyright infringement as "identifying the circum-
stances in which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the actions of another"); see 
also Alfred P. Ewert & Irah H. Donner, Will the New Information Superhighway Create 
"Super" Problems for Software Engineers? Contributory Infringement of Patented or Copy-
righted Software-Related Applications, 4 ALB. LJ. SCI. & Tuca 155, 182-186 (1994) (describ-
ing direct infringement and contributory infringement). 
33. See 1\ventieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 157 (1975) ("An orchestra 
or individual instrumentalist or singer who performs a copyrighted musical composition in ... 
a public place without a license is ... clearly an infringer under the statute. The entrepreneur 
who sponsors such a public performance for profit is also an infringer - direct or 
contributory."). 
34. See KECA Music, Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp. 72, 74-75 (W.D. Mo. 
1977) (employing a theory of vicarious liability to find owner of a bar liable for a hired 
performer's act of direct infringement). 
35. See Lodge Hall Music v. Waco Wrangler Club, 831 F.2d 77, 80 {5th Cir. 1987). 
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B. Direct Infringement Law Applied to Bulletin Board Operators 
It is often difficult to determine whether to characterize a per-
son's actions as directly violative of the copyright owner's rights or 
only as potential third-party infringement. The decisions of the two 
courts that have addressed the issue of computer bulletin board op-
erator liability reflect this difficulty. In Playboy Enterprises v. 
Frena, 36 the court had to determine an operator's liability for the 
acts of users who had uploaded and downloaded the plaintiff's 
copyrighted photographs. Despite the defendant's defense of lack 
of knowledge of the infringing activity,37 the court found the opera-
tor liable as a direct infringer on the ground that providing access to 
the computer bulletin board was equivalent to "distributing" and 
"displaying" the infringing photos.3s 
By contrast, the other court that has analyzed a computer bulle-
tin board operator's liability for infringing acts of users, Sega Enter-
prises v. Maphia, 39 used a theory of third-party liability. In that 
case, a bulletin board operator had allowed users to upload and 
download Sega's copyrighted video games. The court noted that, in 
the instances where the defendants did not themselves upload or 
download copyrighted games, liability could still be found under the 
third-party liability theory of contributory copyright infringement, 
stating, "[e]ven if Defendants do not know exactly when games \vill 
be uploaded to or downloaded from the MAPHIA bulletin board, 
their role in the copying, including the provision of facilities, direc-
tion, knowledge and encouragement, amounts to contributory 
copyright infringement. "40 
Without evidence of the operator's direct involvement in the 
uploading and downloading of copyrighted material, a direct in-
fringement analysis is inappropriate. The Frena court, for example, 
overextended the meaning of the display and distribution rights to 
find direct liability for a bulletin board operator. Courts have con-
sistently applied those provisions to find direct liability only for par-
ties that have played a conscious, active role in the act that 
constitutes "display" or "distribution."41 In the typical situation, a 
36. 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D .. Fla. 1993). 
37. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1554. Since the case was decided on a summary judgment 
posture, the court was obligated to accept this asserted defense as true. 839 F. Supp. at 1555. 
38. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1556-57. 
39. 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
40. Sega, 851 F. Supp. at 686-87; see infra section H.B. 
41. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59, 64 (3rd Cir. 1986) 
(company which knowingly rented out rooms for the viewing of videotapes without permis-
sion of copyright owner to "display" movie found to directly infringe "display" right); Co-
lumbia Pictures Indus. v. Redd Home, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 1984) (same); Iowa 
State University Research Foundation v. ABC, 621 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1980) (Broadcast 
network directly violated "display" right by broadcasting a film without the permission of the 
copyright holder.). Similarly, direct infringement of the "distribution" right has involved tak-
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bulletin board operator provides the service with no intention to 
further infringing activity and often has no knowledge that the in-
fringing activity is taking pface.42 
Merely providing access to the bulletin board is not, in and of 
itself, a violation of a copyright owner's section 106 right to "dis-
play" or "distribute."43 Only the uploading and downloading of 
copyrighted material will provide a basis for finding a direct viola-
tion. If a user does upload or download copyrighted material, it is 
the user's uploading or downloading, not the operator's provision 
of a bulletin board, that is the primary cause of the violation of the 
copyright. The bulletin board is merely a tool by which the user 
infringes. Because it is only the actions of the user that subject the 
operator to potential liability, not the actions of the operator her-
self, a theory of third-party liability is appropriate.44 
This conclusion is further compelled by the distinction the 
Supreme Court drew in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc. 45 between supplying the means to violate a section 106 
right and the direct violation of the right. The Court applied a the-
ory of third-party liability to a manufacturer of video-cassette re-
corders (VCRs) for the infringing activities of the products' users. 
Despite the fact that the VCR enhanced the ability of the users of 
the VCR to infringe, the Court did not apply a theory of "direct" 
infringement to the manufacturers.46 Like the manufacturer of the 
VCR in Sony, the operator of a bulletin board provides a means to 
infringe but is not himself a direct infringer. 
ing an active role in the activity which constitutes "distribution." See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. 
B & H Supply, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 975, 989 (D. Minn. 1986) {finding direct infringement by a 
group of defendants who actively took part in the enterprise to distribute copyrighted 
material). 
This distinction is also apparent in other areas. For example, a concert promoter is not 
considered a "performer" of infringing songs but rather is held liable through his or her 
connection to the direct infringer - the band which "performs" the infringing songs at the 
concert. See, e.g., Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 
F.2d 1159, 1162 {2d Cir. 1971). 
42. See, e.g., Meyer & Underwood, supra note 20. 
43. This, of course, is because the bulletin board initially has no material on it at all. 
Material must be put on the board before infringement can take place. 
44. This sort of distinction has been shown in other cases. For example, in Screen Gems-
Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399, 402-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), the 
court reasoned that a theory of third-party liability could be employed to find liability against 
a radio station which ran noninfringing ads for an infringing record. Although the actions of 
the radio station alone could not constitute direct infringement, the relation of the activities 
of the station to facilitating the distribution of infringing records was a potential basis for 
third-party liability. 
45. 464 U.S. 417 {1984). 
46. Sony, 464 U.S. at 434 (describing plaintiffs' burden as "proving that users of the 
Betamax have infringed the [movie studios'] copyrights and that [the manufacturer of the 
Betamax] should be held responsible for that infringement"). 
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Applying a direct infringement analysis to the operator of a 
computer bulletin board when no action of the operator alone 
could be considered infringement is inappropriate. It does not fol-
low, however, that the operator should be free from liability. There 
are specific circumstances in copyright law when a third party 
should be held liable for the infringing actions of another. 
II. THIRD-PARTY LIABILITY FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
The Copyright Act of 1976 contains no specific statutory author-
ity for finding liability against a party for copyright infringement 
committed by another party. This lack of specific statutory author-
ity, however, has not protected third parties who are closely con-
nected to an infringing activity.47 Courts have developed two 
distinct theories of third-party liability in copyright infringement: 
vicarious liability and contributory copyright infringement.48 The 
key distinction between these theories is that vicarious liability fo-
cuses on the relationship between the primary and third-party in-
fringer, and contributory copyright infringement focuses on 
knowledge of and contribution to the illegal act. 
Section II.A concludes that the doctrine of vicarious liability in 
copyright infringement law cannot be applied to find liability for 
computer bulletin board operators in most situations because oper-
ators do not possess the ability to control the activities of their users 
and usually do not directly benefit from the infringing acts of users. 
Section II.B then argues that the doctrine of contributory copyright 
infringement can be applied to find a computer bulletin board oper-
ator liable for infringing user activity. 
A. Vicarious Liability 
The doctrine of vicarious liability in copyright law is based on 
the tort doctrine of respondeat superior49 but is not limited to the 
employer-employee context.50 In order to find a third party liable 
under this theory, a court must find that two elements are satisfied: 
the third party must have the right and ability to control and super-
vise the activities of the infringing party,si and the third party must 
47. Sony, 464 U.S. at 435 ("The absence of ..• express language in the copyright statute 
does not preclude the imposition of liability for copyright infringements on certain parties 
who have not themselves engaged in the infringing activity." (emphasis added)}; see also H.R. 
REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 158-60 (1976) (specifically recognizing that vicarious 
liability survives the Copyright Act of 1976). 
48. See 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, CoPYRIGHr: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.1 (1989). 
49. Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
50. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 48, § 6.3. 
51. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963). 
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have an obvious and direct :financial interest in the activities of the 
direct infringer.52 
1. Control 
The first element of a vicarious liability analysis is control. The 
concept of control in vicarious liability is based on a combination of 
legal and practical ability to control a third party's activities. A 
practical ability to control the third party, however, is essential:53 in 
many cases where it would be legally possible for a party to insist 
upon the power to police and monitor the acts of another, courts 
have been unwilling to impose liability when it would be unrealistic 
and overburdensome for the defendant to exercise such power. 
This principle is supported by a comparison of the approaches 
courts have taken when confronted with situations where legal con-
trol was possible, but the level of practical control varied. 
In Davis v. E. L DuPont de Nemours & Co.,54 a corporate spon-
sor of an infringing television program was found liable by the ap-
plication of vicarious liability. The court found legal control in the 
fact that the sponsor "had to approve of several steps in the produc-
tion of the television program."55 Practical control was found be-
cause the sponsor had insisted on and played an active role in 
determining the content of the program.56 
In contrast, practical control was found lacking in Bevan v. 
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 57 Although the sponsors did 
have a provision in the sponsorship agreement "affording them the 
right to request alteration prior to filming,"58 that agreement was 
also found to "vest sole direction and control over [the] production, 
performance and broadcasting" of the infringing television program 
in the network.59 In this case, despite the fact that it would have 
been possible for the sponsor to insist on greater substantive control 
over the program, the court did not find the sponsor liable because 
52. Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 309; see also Pinkham v. Sara Lee Corp., 983 F.2d 824, 834 (8th 
Cir. 1992); Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph v. Associated Telephone Directory Publish-
ers, 756 F.2d 801, 811 (11th Cir. 1985). 
53. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 48, § 6.3.2; see also Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 
F. Supp. 1492, 1496-97 (E.D. Cal. 1994); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Behulak, 651 F. Supp. 57, 
61-62 (M.D. Fla. 1986). 
54. 240 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
55. Davis, 240 F. Supp. at 631. 
56. Davis, 240 F. Supp. at 632 ("DuPont had the ultimate power to determine content of 
the program and exercised that power .••• "). 
57. Bevan, 329 F. Supp. 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
58. Bevan, 329 F. Supp. at 610. 
59. Bevan, 329 F. Supp. at 610. 
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in actuality it did not retain a practical ability to supervise the net-
work's infringing actions.60 
The degree of practical control necessary to support a finding of 
vicarious liability is a fact-specific inquiry. However, an examina-
tion of two extremes sheds light on the kind of issues at stake in this 
analysis.61 The "dance hall" cases62 illustrate a situation where de-
gree of practical control was sufficient to sustain a finding of vicari-
ous liability. In these cases, a dance hall proprietor - or proprietor 
of some other sort of entertainment business - is held liable for 
the infringing acts of an independent contractor, such as a band or 
an orchestra, that performed copyrighted music without the copy-
right owner's permission.63 The requisite legal control is demon-
strated by the contractual relationship between the proprietor and 
the contractor. Through contract, a dance hall proprietor is able to 
insist upon a right to supervise the activities of the band or orches-
tra. Practical control is present because the proprietor can easily 
monitor the band's performance and can insist on the particular 
music to be performed. 
The "landlord-tenant" cases,64 in which plaintiffs attempt to im-
pose liability on a landlord for the infringing acts of her tenants, 
represent the opposite extreme. Although it is theoretically possi-
ble for a landlord to possess legal control by insisting on lease 
clauses that allow her to monitor and police the activities of her 
tenants, the lack of a business rationale for insisting on this kind of 
control and the practical difficulties in conducting monitoring of 
tenant activities make it impractical for landlords to exert much 
control over tenants. As a result, vicarious liability has not been a 
successful third-party liability theory in the landlord-tenant 
situation. 65 
60. Bevan, 329 F. Supp. at 610. 
61. The leading case on vicarious liability suggests that the control requirement for the 
imposition of vicarious liability is best analyzed by placing a given situation on a spectrum 
between an employer-employee relationship and a landlord-tenant relationship. Shapiro, 
Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963). 
62. Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing and Breeding Assn., 554 
F.2d 1213 (1st Cir. 1977); Dreamland Ball Room v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354 
(7th Cir. 1929); KECA Music, Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp. 72 (W.D. Mo. 1977). 
These cases were cited by the Supreme Court in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 437 n.18 (1984). 
63. See Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307 ("[T]he cases are legion which hold the dance hall pro-
prietor liable for the infringement of copyright resulting from the performance of a musical 
composition by a band or orchestra whose activities provide the proprietor with a source of 
customers and enhanced income."). 
64. See Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1938); Vernon Music Corp. v. First Dev. 
Corp., 1983-84 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 'l[ 25,686 (D. Mass. June 19, 1984); Fromont v. 
Aeolian Co., 254 F. 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1918). 
65. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 48, § 6.3.2 ("The reason courts do not impose vicarious 
liability on the landlord in these situations is that, because the tenant's activities will gener-
ally be closeted from the landlord's view, and because the landlord has no direct financial 
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The control requirement essential to the application of vicarious 
liability does not exist in the case of a bulletin board operator be-
cause an operator lacks practical control over the users' activity.66 
Although it might be possible for a bulletin board operator to pre-
vent infringement by contemporaneously monitoring every upload 
and download to the bulletin board, requiring such control would 
be unrealistic and burdensome. In many cases, a bulletin board op-
erator is a hobbyist who has neither the time to monitor constantly 
activity taking place on the board nor the financial resources to hire 
a monitor. The large volume of usage on commercial bulletin 
boards such as CompuServe also makes constant monitoring bur-
densome and expensive.67 In addition, it is even possible for users 
to hide their activities, making it difficult for the operator to detect 
misuse despite monitoring efforts.68 
The relationship between a computer bulletin board operator 
and the users of the board lies much closer to the "landlord-tenant" 
paradigm than to the "dance hall" paradigm. The operator does 
not hire the user to perform any services, and, unlike a dance hall 
proprietor, it is very difficult for an operator to monitor a user's 
activity. As demonstrated by the landlord-tenant cases, courts are 
reluctant to impose a monitoring requirement when it would be un-
realistic and burdensome for a party to exercise control over the 
direct infringer.69 
interest in the tenant's activities, it will usually be impractical for the landlord to insist on, or 
to exercise, this degree of control."). 
For example, in Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686 {2d Cir. 1938), the plaintiffs owned a 
copyright for a handwriting analysis chart and discovered that a former employee of theirs 
had illegally copied this chart for use in her own handwriting analysis business. In addition to 
suing the former employee, the plaintiffs also sued the landlord of the location where the 
former employee had been selling infringing copies of their handwriting chart, despite the 
fact that the landlord did not know of the activity and was not involved with the infringing 
activity in any way. Deutsch, 98 F.2d at 688. The court refused to impose vicarious liability 
on the landlord, because the landlord was unaware of the infringing activity and had no 
business relationship with the tenant beyond that of landlord and tenant Deutsch, 98 F.2d at 
688; see also Vernon Music, 1983-84 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) at 19,065 (citing lack of control 
by corporate landlord as a reason not to find vicarious liability). 
66. The ability to gain the legal ability to control user activity might also be problematic 
in some circumstances - e.g., when users break into the board without permission or when 
the board is on a network and the individual operator does not control access. However, 
even if the operator had the legal ability to control user activity, it would not form a basis for 
the application of vicarious liability unless the practical ability to control also existed. See 
supra notes 53-68 and accompanying text 
67. See Jonathan Gilbert, Note, Computer Bulletin Board Operator Liability for User Mis-
use, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 439, 447 {1985). It would also be extremely difficult for monitors 
to determine the copyright status of the large amount of communications they would have to 
examine. 
68. See Meyer & Underwood, supra note 20, at 46 (describing ability of some users to 
hide their actions from bulletin board operators). 
69. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text 
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2. Benefit 
In addition to the requirement of control, courts impose vicari-
ous liability on third parties only if the third party benefitted from 
the direct infringement. In order to meet this requirement, the 
vicarious infringer must have "an obvious and direct financial inter-
est in the exploitation of copyrighted materials."70 This require-
ment is typically fulfilled only when the third party's financial 
benefit is tied to the benefit the direct infringer receives from in-
fringing acts.71 
This test is easily met when a party is receiving a percentage 
from infringing sales. For example, in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. 
H. L. Green Co., 72 a chain store operator had allowed an independ-
ent concessionaire to sell infringing records in its stores in return 
for being given Qetween ten and twelve percent of the concession-
aire's gross receipts from the infringing sales. Here the benefit test 
was met because the chain store's profits were tied directly to the 
profit the direct infringer received from its infringing sales.73 
The "dance hall" cases also demonstrate a situation in which 
direct benefit has been found because the profits the dance hall 
proprietor receives are directly tied to the profitability of the pri-
mary infringer. In a typical situation, a dance hall proprietor keeps 
a percentage of the gate receipts and thus directly benefits from the 
direct infringement of the band or orchestra because the dance hall 
operator receives a direct monetary benefit from every customer 
the band or orchestra attracts.74 In contrast, if a dance hall proprie-
tor rented the hall to an orchestra and retained no interest in the 
70. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963); see also 
Pinkham v. Sara Lee Corp., 983 F.2d 824, 834 (8th Cir. 1992); GoIDSTEIN, supra note 48, 
§ 6.3.1 (describing the benefit requirement of vicarious liability). 
71. See Vernon Music Corp. v. First Dev. Corp., 1983-84 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH} lj( 
25,686 (D. Mass. June 19, 1984) (holding that a landlord who charges a rent which is not "tied 
to the profitability" of the direct infringer is entitled to judgment as a matter of law); see also 
Roy Export Co. v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 344 F. Supp. 1350, 1353 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
72. 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963). 
73. The Shapiro court stated: 
By reserving for itself a proportionate share of the gross receipts from Jalen's sales of 
phonograph records, Green had a most definite financial interest in the success of Jalen's 
concession; 10% or 12% of the sales price of every record sold by Jalen, whether "boot-
leg" or legitimate, found its way - both literally and figuratively - into the coffers of 
the Green Company. 
316 F.2d at 308. 
74. See Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing and Breeding Assn., 554 
F.2d 1213, 1215 (1st Cir. 1977); KECA Music, Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp. 72, 
74-75 (W.D. Mo. 1977). 
The orchestra or the band directly benefits from their infringement if they keep a percent-
age of the gate receipts because they will earn more money if they can attract more custom-
ers. They would also benefit if they charge a flat fee because the fee they can charge will be 
greater depending on their ability to attract customers. 
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business done or in the gate receipts, no direct benefit would be 
found.75 · 
For the same reason, a landlord usually has no direct financial 
interest in infringement committed by a tenant. The landlord re-
ceives a flat payment from her tenant regardless of the tenant's ac-
tivities. The indirect interest the landlord might have in the 
infringement - for example, if the infringement makes the busi-
ness conducted on the premises more profitable, the tenant will be 
more likely to pay rent - is not enough to establish the direct ben-
efit required because the landlord expects no more or less money 
based on the profit the tenant receives from infringing.16 
The benefit prong may or may not be met in the case of a bulle-
tin board operator. In many situations, a bulletin board operator 
allows users to access the board for free and thus does not receive 
any financial benefit from the infringing use.77 The benefit require-
ment is still unmet when the operator charges a fiat fee for usage or 
a fee based on the amount of time used.78 The operator's benefit in 
this circumstance is akin to the interest a landlord possesses in re-
ceiving rent from a tenant. Like a landlord, a computer bulletin 
board operator charging a flat fee for usage or a fee based on time 
receives the same "rent" regardless of the nature of the users' 
activity.79 
The strongest argument for a finding of direct benefit would be 
that the availability of infringing material on a bulletin board would 
attract more users and therefore increase the fees that an operator 
would collect. If the amount of infringement occurring on the 
board were significant enough to have this effect, it could form a 
basis for a finding of benefit that is analogous to a dance hall pro-
prietor's interest in gate receipts. However, this w~uld still not pro-
vide a basis for vicarious liability because, as argued above, a 
75. See Fromont v. Aeolian Co., 254 F. 592, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1918} (analogizing an individ-
ual who rents a premises for the purposes of a performance without keeping an interest in 
the business to a landlord); see also Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Larkin, 672 F. Supp. 531, 534-35 
(D. Me. 1987); Roy Export Co. v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 344 F. Supp. 1350, 1353 
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (refusing to find vicarious liability because the defendant had no financial 
interest in the infringing performance). 
76. See, e.g., Vernon Music Corp. v. First Dev. Corp., 1983-84 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) l][ 
25,686 (D. Mass. June 19, 1984} (holding that a landlord who charges a rent that is not "tied 
to the profitability" of the direct infringer is "entitled to judgement as a matter of law"); see 
also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 48, § 6.3.2 n.14. 
77. Cf. Roy Export Co. v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 344 F. Supp. 1350, 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 
1972} (holding that an organization that did not financially benefit from the activities of the 
direct infringement could not be held liable under a theory of vicarious liability). 
78. Most of the major online services use a fee arrangement similar to this. For example, 
America Online charges a flat fee for a set amount of use and an additional fee for time used 
beyond the set amount. 
79. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. 
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typical operator would be unable to control the users' infringing 
activity.80 
Both control and benefit must be found in order to apply vicari-
ous liability.81 Although a computer bulletin board operator might 
sometimes benefit from the infringing activities of users, the opera-
tor is normally unable to exert the practical control necessary to 
sustain a finding of vicarious liability. Therefore, vicarious liability 
cannot, except in rare circumstance, provide a basis of third-party 
liability for bulletin board operators. In order to find a bulletin 
board operator liable for the acts of a third party, a different theory 
of third-party liability is necessary. 
B. Contributory Copyright Infringement 
Contributory copyright infringement is a separate and distinct 
theory of third-party liability in copyright infringement82 that stems 
from the tort doctrine of enterprise liability.s3 As the Second Cir-
cuit has stated, "[O]ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activ-
ity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing 
conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory' in-
fringer."84 Thus, instead of turning on control and benefit, the doc-
trine of contributory copyright infringement requires that a party 
possess knowledge of the infringing activity and assist in that in-
fringing activity. 
As the different standards of liability under each theory reflect, 
the theory of contributory copyright infringement and the theory of 
80. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Behulak, 651 F. Supp. 57, 62 (M.D. Fla. 1986) (refusing 
to find vicarious liability where a "financial interest existed but an ability to control and super-
vise did not exist). 
One can imagine a situation where a bulletin board operator hired a user as an independ-
ent contractor to upload infringing material in order to attract other users. In this circum-
stance, it would be possible to establish the practical ability to control that user's activity due 
to the business relationship entered into by the parties. See Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686, 
688 (2d Cir. 1938) (refusing to find third-party liability because the third party was not in 
partnership with the direct infringer); Vernon Music Corp. v. First Dev. Corp., 1983-84 Copy-
right L. Dec. (CCH) 'lI 25686, at 19065 (D. Mass. June 19, 1984) (refusing to find third-party 
liability for landlord because landlord was not involved in a "common enterprise" with the 
infringer). Vicarious liability theory would provide a solid basis for finding the bulletin board 
operator liable in this situation. Indeed, this situation would be exactly analogous to the 
"dance hall" cases. However, this fact pattern appears to be a rare occurrence. 
81. See Roy Export Co. v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 344 F. Supp. 1350, 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 
1972) (refusing to find vicarious liability where control was established but benefit was not 
found). 
82. See Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 292 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (emphasiz-
ing the distinct character of contributory copyright infringement as opposed to vicarious lia-
bility); see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 48, § 6.1. 
83. See Demetriades, 690 F. Supp. at 292; see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 23, 
§ 12.04[A][2]. 
84. Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 
1162 (2d Cir. 1971). 
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vicarious liability address different concerns.85 For example, knowl-
edge that infringing activity is taking place is not required to impose 
vicarious liability but is required to find contributory copyright in-
fringement. Conversely, while benefit is required to impose vicari-
ous liability, a contributory infringer does not have to benefit from 
the infringing activity in order to be found liable. Vicarious liability 
turns upon the relationship between the defendant and the direct 
infringer86 and is designed to prevent a third party from benefiting 
from activities of a direct infringer that it could and should have 
prevented.87 In contrast, contributory copyright infringement turns 
on a defendant's relationship to the act of infringement.88 This doc-
trine imposes liability on those who assist a party to commit the tort 
of copyright infringement and thereby -serves as a disincentive to 
participation in infringing activity.89 
Section Il.B.1 explains the knowledge requirement of the con-
tributory copyright infringement doc~e. ~ection II.B.2 explains 
the assistance prong of the contributory copyright infringement 
test. Section II.B.3 argues that the contributory copyright infringe-
ment standard presents the best theory for imposing third-party lia-
bility on computer bulletin board operators. 
1. Knowledge 
In order to impose liability under the theory of contributory 
copyright infringement, a court must find that the defendant had 
knowledge that infringing activity was taking place. The contribu-
tory infringer must be aware of the infringing activities and also 
that the acts are illegal.90 
85. See Demetriades, 690 F. Supp. at 292 n.5. 
86. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 48, § 6.1, at 708. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, 
PROSSER & KEETON ON TIIE LAW OF TOR1S § 69 {5th ed. 1984) (discussing vicarious liability 
in tort). 
87. See Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Assn., 554 
F.2d 1213, 1214-15 (1st Cir. 1977) (arguing that vicarious liability serves to prevent individu-
als from profiting by another's infringement "by merely claiming ignorance that any violation 
would take place"). 
88. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 48, § 6.1. 
89. See generally KEETON ET AL, supra note 86, § 72 {discussing the doctrine of enter-
prise liability in tort). 
90. One of the leading cases on contributory copyright infringement, Screen Gems-
Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), supports 
the view that knowledge that the activity is illegal is necessary. In that case the direct in-
fringer was a record company that distributed infringing records. The plaintiffs were unable 
to serve the direct infringer with process, Screen Gems, 256 F. Supp. at 401, so they instead 
brought suit against an advertising agency that created advertisements promoting the sale of 
the infringing records, a radio station which ran the advertisements, and the shipping agent 
hired by the direct infringer to ship the records. These defendants moved for summary 
judgement, arguing that they could not be found liable because they did not meet the criteria 
for vicarious liability. Screen Gems, 256 F. Supp. at 402. The court rejected this motion and 
instead applied a theory of contributory copyright infringement, emphasizing that there was a 
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The knowledge requirement may be fulfilled by showing either 
actual or constructive knowledge of the infringing nature of a direct 
infringer's act.91 Constructive knowledge can be imputed to a party 
if the circumstances surrounding an activity should have indicated 
to the defendant that the activity was illegal.92 For example, in 
Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc.,93 the 
court held that constructive knowledge could be imputed to an ad-
vertising agency that had made ads for a company that was selling 
illegally copied records and to a radio station that had aired those 
advertisements based on "well-known indicia of the fly-by-night" 
nature of the company that was selling the illegally copied 
records.94 These indicia included the smallness of the record manu-
facturer, its lack of a permanent location, and the suspiciously low 
price of the records being sold.9s 
One common situation in which constructive knowledge must 
be imputed is when a defendant sells or manufactures equipment 
that facilitates the making of illegal copies, for example, video-
question of fact as to the third-party defendants' knowledge of the nature of the direct in-
fringer's activity. Screen Gems, 256 F. Supp. at 404-05. It is important to note that the fac-
tual issue was in regard to knowledge of the nature of the activity, not knowledge that the 
activity was taking place. Screen-Gems, 256 F. Supp. at 405 ("While the factual showing 
against [the defendants] is somewhat tenuous, sufficient [evidence] has been set forth to per-
mit the trier of fact •.. to conclude that [the defendants] had either actual or constructive 
knowledge of the infringement ...• " (emphasis added)). 
Other cases are in accord with this view. See, e.g., Childress v. Taylor, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd., 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991). In this case, a theater owner 
was found not liable as a contributory infringer for an infringing performance that took place 
in his theater. The court based this decision on the fact that the owner did not have actual or 
constructive knowledge that the performance was infringing, despite the fact that the owner 
clearly knew that the performance was taking place. See also Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. 
Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (describing the type 
of knowledge required as having "knowledge, or reason to know, of the infringing nature" of 
the direct infringer's activities (emphasis added)); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 23, 
§ 12.04[A][2][a] ("Thus, if there is knowledge that the work in question constitutes an in-
fringemen~ then one who causes another to infringe will himself be liable as an infringer 
.... " (emphasis added)). But see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 48, § 6.2 n.1. Goldstein argues that 
the knowledge requirement means the contributory infringer need only be aware of the di-
rect infringer's activities and not that these activities constitute copyright infringement. "To 
be liable for contributory infringement, the defendant need only know of the direct in-
fringer's activities, and need not reach the legal conclusion that these activities infringe a 
copyrighted work." Id. 
91. See, e.g., !SC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310, 1331-32 (N.D. 
Ill. 1990) (finding contributory copyright infringement based on a defendant's purchase of 
software with actual knowledge that the sale was in violation of the original copyright 
owner's license); see also Ewert & Donner, supra note 32, at 186. 
92. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 48, § 6.2 (arguing that constructive knowledge would exist 
if a defendant "knew of facts that would have prompted a reasonable person to inquire into 
whether an infringement was occurring"); see also Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417, 439 (1984) (recognizing constructive knowledge of wrongdoing for sellers whose 
customers use equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material). 
93. 256 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
94. Screen Gems, 256 F. Supp. at 404. 
95. Screen Gems, 256 F. Supp. at 404. 
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cassette recorders or quick audio-tape copiers. Because a manufac-
turer of such an item is unlikely to be aware of the activities of the 
consumers who purchase the product, actual knowledge that the de-
vice is being used to infringe copyrights is unlikely to be present. In 
this situation, courts must adopt a legal standard of liability that will 
determine when constructive knowledge should be imputed. 
The Supreme Court squarely confronted this problem in Sony 
Corp. v. Universal Studios, Inc.96 and adopted a lenient standard of 
liability for manufacturers of equipment capable of infringing uses. 
In this case, the copyright owners of various motion pictures at-
tempted to hold Sony liable for copyright infringement because 
Sony produced and sold VCRs. that allowed consumers to copy 
their films illegally. The Court dealt with this claim by borrowing 
the "staple article of commerce" doctrine from patent law,97 hold-
ing that if a piece of equipment used for infringing copyright was 
"capable of substantial non-infringing uses,"98 then the manufac-
turer of the equipment cannot be held liable as a contributory copy-
right infringer.99 Because the Court found the "time shifting" 
capabilities of a VCR to be a substantial noninfringing use,100 Sony 
was not held liable as a contributory copyright infringer.101 
96. 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984) (describing the task of imposing third-party liability on a 
manufacturer as resting on the fact that "it has sold equipment with constructive knowledge 
of the fact that its consumers may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copy-
righted material"). 
97. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. 
98. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. 
99. The dissent in Sony adopted a similar test, but argued for a different standard of 
liability. While the majority required only that a product have significant non-infringing uses, 
the dissent argued that "a significant portion of the product's use" should be non-infringing. 
Sony, 464 U.S. at 491 (second emphasis added); see also A. Samuel Oddi, Contributory Copy-
right Infringement: The Tort and Technological Tensions, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 47, 56-57 
{1989) (arguing that the dissent's approach in Sony effectively imposed a negligence standard 
on manufacturers of equipment capable of infringing uses). 
100. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 456. 
101. The standard adopted by the Court in Sony has been applied to shield defendant 
manufacturers from liability as contributory infringers. For example, in Vault Corp. v. Quaid 
Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 {5th Cir. 1988), the court refused to find a manufacturer of 
software that defeated copyright protection of other companies' software liable as a contribu-
tory infringer. Despite the fact that the software made it possible for users to infringe others' 
copyrights by making and distributing unauthorized copies of protected software, the court 
found that the ability of the program to facilitate the making of legal 'archival' copies for the 
legitimate buyers of the protected software was a 'substantial non-infringing use,' Vault 
Corp., 847 F.2d at 262, and therefore declined to impose liability on Quaid under a contribu-
tory copyright infringement theory. Vault Corp., 847 F.2d at 267. 
The dissent in Sony worried that the staple article of commerce doctrine would effectively 
destroy the doctrine of contributory infringement. The dissent summed up its concern by 
arguing that "only the most unimaginative manufacturer would be unable to demonstrate 
that an image duplicating product is 'capable' of substantial non-infringing uses." Sony, 464 
U.S. at 498. However, despite this worry, courts seem to have been able to pick out bogus 
and overimaginative justifications for products that promote copyright infringement. See 
Ewert & Donner, supra note 32, at 192 (arguing that courts have been able to detect purely 
imaginative uses and reviewing cases in which courts have detected such imaginative uses). 
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Despite the relatively low standard the Supreme Court imposed 
upon manufacturers of equipment capable of infringing uses, courts 
have imposed a higher duty of care upon persons who maintain 
control over equipment that has both infringing uses and "substan-
tial non-infringing uses." In essence, courts apply a negligence stan-
dard: a person who offers access to a device with infringing uses 
owes a duty to copyright owners to prevent access to equipment 
when a reasonable person would know that the machine was going 
to be used for illegal purposes. 
For example, in RCA Records, Inc. v. All-Fast Systems, Inc., 102 a 
retail copy service had provided access to a machine capable of 
making copies of cassette tapes at fast speeds. Although the copy 
service did not supply original tapes for customers to copy, the em-
ployees of the store performed the actual copying at the request of 
customers.103 Manufacturers of pre-recorded, copyrighted music 
cassettes brought suit against the copy service alleging copyright in-
fringement. In addition to finding that the acts of the employees 
were enough to support a finding of direct infringement against the 
copy service, 104 the court also dealt with the possibility that al-
lowing customers to have access to the machines to make their own 
copies might be a basis for contributory infringement liability. The 
court ordered that the store could not allow customers to use the 
fast copy machines if the retailer had "reasonable cause to believe 
[a customer] intend[ed] to use the machine to copy plaintiff's copy-
righted recordings."105 The court justified this standard of care by 
concluding that the retailer was in a better position to control the 
use of the potentially infringing device than a manufacturer.106 
Bulletin board operators are not analogous to manufacturers. 
Under the Sony test, a court would not impose liability on a com-
puter bulletin board operator if the bulletin board operator is con-
sidered a manufacturer who sold a product to a consumer. In the 
most limited sense, the computer bulletin board operator is just 
selling time to users to operate a central computer.107 Although a 
102. 594 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
103. In a similar case, Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Electronics Distrib., 360 F. Supp. 821 
(E.D.N.Y. 1973), contributory infringement was found when the copying store provided ac-
cess not only to a fast copy machine, but originals as well. 
104. This finding of liability did not rest on a contributory copyright infringement theory, 
but instead on the acts of the employees who performed the act that constituted the illegal 
"copying." All-Fast, 594 F. Supp. at 337. 
105. All-Fast, 594 F. Supp. at 339. In a similar case, the Eighth Circuit approved an in-
junction that required retailers to inspect the tapes the customers were copying before al-
lowing them to use the fast-copying machines. See RCA/Ariola Intl. v. Thomas & Grayston 
Co., 845 F.2d 773, 778 (8th Cir. 1988). 
106. See All-Fast, 594 F. Supp. at 339. 
107. See Loftus E. Becker, Jr., The Liability of Computer Bulletin Board Operators for 
Defamation Posted By Others, 22 CoNN. L. REv. 203, 218-21 (1989). 
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computer bulletin board can be used to infringe copyright, many 
uses are non-infringing and legal. For example, bulletin boards pro-
vide a forum for debate of political and philosophical ideas.198 Bul-
letin boards also provide a forum for individuals to socialize and 
build friendships.109 Some have even met their spouses through 
computer bulletin boards.110 Given the substantial noninfringing 
uses of bulletin boards, operators would not be liable if they were 
viewed as manufacturers. 
On the other hand, a computer bulletin board operator retains 
more control over the potentially infringing device - the bulletin 
board - than a manufacturer does over, for example, a VCR after 
it has been sold to a user.111 Like the owner of a shop that allows 
customers to use a fast audio-tape copying machine, the operator of 
a bulletin board is in the best position to control the use of the 
potentially infringing device. Courts have held individuals who al-
low others to have access to a machine with potential infringing 
uses to a negligence standard - i.e., courts will impute constructive 
knowledge to such an individual when a reasonable person would 
have known that users of the device were engaging in infringing 
acts.112 
2. Contribution 
In order to establish liability under a theory of contributory 
copyright infringement, a copyright holder must also prove that a 
defendant materially contributed to the infringing activities of the 
direct infringer.113 Exactly what constitutes "material" contribution 
is a fact-specific inquiry, but the case law provides some guidelines. 
For example, a promoter who organized and directed a concert in 
which musicians performed copyrighted music without the copy-
right owner's permission was held, through the acts of promoting 
the concert, to have provided the sort of "material" assistance nee-
108. Schlachter, supra note 1, at 92 (describing computer bulletin boards as "a major 
force for intellectual, political, and informational exchanges"). 
109. Mark A. Stamaty, Well-Wishers on the Internet, TIME, Sept 5, 1994, at 18 (describing 
messages and support given by users of a local bulletin board when one of the users devel-
oped terminal cancer). 
110. For example, conservative radio commentator Rush Limbaugh married a woman he 
met through an e-mail exchange. Walking the Walk, PEOPLE, June 13, 1994, at 70. 
111. See RCA Records, Inc. v. All-Fast Systems, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 335, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 
1984) (arguing that manufacturers are not in a position to control the use of a device once it 
is sold to a consumer). 
112. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text. 
113. See Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, 443 F.2d 1159, 
1162 (2d Cir. 1971); see also Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 
970 (9th Cir. 1992); cable/Home Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 845 (11th Cir. 
1990); Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Redd Home, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 168 (3rd Cir. 1984). 
236 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:217 
essary to establish contributory copyright infringement.114 Addi-
tionally, a court has held that a radio station that ran 
advertisements, which did not contain infringing material, promot-
ing the sale of records that included infringing songs could be held 
liable as a contributory infringer based on its assistance to the direct 
infringer.115 
In contrast, courts have concluded in some situations that the 
alleged contributing activity was too tangentially related to the di-
rect infringement to establish material infringement. For example, 
one court refused to extend contributory copyright infringement li-
ability to real-estate brokers who sold land to individuals who were 
making a home based on illegally copied architectural plans.116 
It is important to note that the material contribution require-
ment and the knowledge requirement are interrelated. The sub-
stantial involvement necessary to support a finding of material 
contribution is often a key factor in proving that the defendant ac-
ted with constructive knowledge of the direct infringer's activity.111 
3. Application to Bulletin Board Operators 
Contributory copyright infringement provides an appropriate 
framework to determine a computer bulletin board operator's lia-
bility for direct infringement by users. First, the type of assistance 
that a bulletin board operator provides to an infringing user is "ma-
terial." Without access to the bulletin board, the illegal copying and 
distribution of copyrighted material through the use of the bulletin 
board cannot take place. Courts have not hesitated to find that the 
material contribution requirement has been met in similar scenar-
ios, where the third-party defendant supplied elements necessary to 
conduct copying.us 
If a plaintiff can prove that a bulletin board operator had actual 
or constructive knowledge of infringing activities on a computer 
114. Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162-63. 
115. Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399, 403-
05 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
. 116. See Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 294 (S.D.N.Y 1988); see also Varon 
v. Santa Fe Reporter, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 716, 718 (D.N.M. 1982) (finding that an 
employee who provided her employer with an art magazine that included photographs of 
Georgia O'Keefe and her paintings, whose employer then copied the pictures from that mag-
azine and illegally published them in a newspaper, was not liable because she "took no active 
part in the determination that the pictures would be used"). 
117. See Gm.DSTEIN, supra note 48, § 6.2 ("The closer the defendant's acts are to the 
directly infringing activity, the stronger will be the inference that the defendant knew of the 
activity."). 
118. See Telerate Sys., Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); RSO Records, 
Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp. 849, 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 597 F. 
Supp. 5, 8-10 (N.D. Ill. 1983); see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 23, § 12.04(A)(2)(b) 
(discussing providing the means to infringe as constituting material contribution). 
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bulletin board, the board's operator should be held liable for con-
tributory copyright infringement.119 In some situations, the bulletin 
board operator's activities in soliciting infringing material and pro-
moting the use of his board for copyright infringement will be so 
intimately connected to the act of direct infringement that construc-
tive knowledge will be easily shown.120 Absent this sort of obvious 
participation in the act of infringement, however, a large question is 
left open: under what circumstances should courts impute construc-
tive .knowledge to the bulletin board operator? It is the answer to 
this question that should determine the liability of an operator in 
most circumstances. 
III. DETERMINING COMPUTER BULLETIN BOARD OPERATOR 
LIABILITY UNDER CONTRIBUTORY COPYRIGHT 
INFRINGEMENT DOCTRINE 
Whether a computer bulletin board operator has constructive 
.knowledge of users' infringing activity will be the critical factor that 
determines an operator's liability under contributory copyright in-
fringement doctrine. This Part argues that imputing constructive 
knowledge to a bulletin board operator only when she knows or 
should have known of infringing uses best accommodates the inter-
ests of the parties involved and comports well with precedent. 
Courts should require that bulletin board operators be aware of 
what their users are doing. This can be accomplished if courts re-
quire bulletin board operators to engage in periodic monitoring of 
the contents of their boards. This limited monitoring requirement 
would ensure that obviously copyrighted material would be re-
moved from the board relatively quickly. If an operator suspects 
that a certain file on his board contains copyrighted material, he 
should check the copyright status of the material before allowing 
users to download it. This periodic monitoring requirement should 
also be combined with a requirement to inform users that the board 
should not be used for illegal purposes.121 These requirements are 
relatively easy for bulletin board operators to fulfill. As such, they 
take into account both the practical limitations on operator control 
and the balance between promoting new technology and protecting 
interests of copyright owners. 
Courts' determinations should be informed by several fact-
based tests. 1. How many infringing items were present on the 
board? If many items on the board contained infringing material, 
an operator should have been aware that users were abusing the 
119. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679, 686-87 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
120. See Sega, 851 F. Supp. at 686-87. 
121. The University of Michigan computing environment contains such a notice. 
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board.122 2. How long had the infringing material been on the 
board? The longer material had been on the board the more courts 
should infer that the operator knew it was there. 3. What was the 
nature of the infringing item? If the item is the newest version of a 
popular software product or clearly marked as the intellectual prop-
erty of the copyright holder, it would be relatively easy for the op-
erator to determine the infringing nature of the item. It is highly 
unlikely, for example, that Microsoft would wish to distribute Win-
dows '95 for free over the Internet while at the same time trying to 
sell it in stores. 4. Was it possible for the operator to know of the 
infringement? Some sophisticated hackers are able to camouflage 
their use of an innocent operator's bulletin board.123 In this situa-
tion, the bulletin board operator has no reasonable means to dis-
cover the infringing use, and the knowledge element of 
contributory copyright infringement would therefore be missing. 
These tests, of course, are not exhaustive but they do shape a gen-
eral approach to the inquiry. 
This proposal properly balances the interests implicated in de-
termining computer bulletin board operator liability. Computer 
bulletin board operators wish to avoid liability and minimize their 
risk so that they can continue to provide bulletin boards profita-
bly.124 If bulletin board operator liability for user copyright in-
fringement is too broad, the costs of operating12s and using bulletin 
boards would be inflated and the growth of beneficial communica-
tions technology - with many uses completely unrelated to copy-
right infringement126 - might be stymied.121 
Copyright holders, on the other hand, have an interest in being 
able to protect the integrity of their statutory monopoly. A deci-
sion never to hold bulletin board operators liable for user infringe-
ment would often deny a copyright owner any relief due to the 
difficulty of finding and locating the direct infringer.12s The 
122. Cf. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 491 (1984) {Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (suggesting the adoption of a test that would apply liability to the maker of a 
product based on the amount of the product's use that constitutes direct infringement). 
123. See Meyer & Underwood, supra note 20, at 46. 
124. For hobbyists who provide access to their bulletin boards for free, the measure of 
profit would be the personal gratification gained from pursuing the hobby. At some point 
the risks of running a bulletin board would outweigh this gratification. 
125. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text for a discussion on the potentially high 
costs of constantly monitoring a bulletin board for infringing activity. 
126. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text. 
127. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 48, § 6.2.2. 
128. Id. This difficulty is avoided when applying contributory copyright infringement. 
For an action of contributory copyright infringement to be maintained, the direct 
copyright infringer does not actually have to be joined in the suit against the contribu-
tory infringer. Indeed, the direct copyright infringer's identity need not even be known 
as long as direct infringement can be shown to have occurred. 
Ewert & Donner, supra note 32, at 183-84. 
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Supreme Court articulated similar interests when it announced the 
standard of liability to be imposed on manufacturers of devices with 
potentially infringing uses. "The staple article of commerce doc-
trine must strike a balance between a copyright holder's legitimate 
demand for effective - not merely symbolic - protection of the 
statutory monopoly, and the rights of others to freely engage in sub-
stantially unrelated areas of commerce."129 
The most important interest to consider in shaping the standard 
of liability for computer bulletin board operators, however, is that 
of society at large. Society has a substantial interest in maintaining 
the integrity of the copyright monopoly.130 A standard of imputing 
constructive knowledge that is too low will diminish authors' incen-
tives to engage in creative endeavors by making unauthorized pro-
duction and distribution of their works too easy. This will, in turn, 
injure society by denying it the works that might have been en-
couraged by copyright protections. 
Society also has an interest, however, in promoting the growth 
of information technology like computer bulletin boards. This tech-
nology has a wide array of useful applications, and some experts are 
predicting that such technology will create a "global revolution."131 
A standard which regularly holds all bulletin board operators liable 
for user infringement threatens the benefits derived from legal ac-
tivities in an attempt to prevent illegal copyright infringement.132 
Moreover, even if computer bulletin board operators could bear 
the costs of a contemporaneous monitoring requirement - which 
essentially would be required under a strict standard of liability -
the burden of monitoring every communication would severely un-
dermine the utility of bulletin boards. One of the major attractive 
features of a computer bulletin board is its ability to transmit large 
quantities of information quickly.133 The time required to monitor 
every communication made via bulletin board and to make certain 
129. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984). 
130. Copyright, in the words of the United States Constitution, serves "[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and the useful Arts." U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8. As the Supreme Court 
has noted, copyright accomplishes this goal by granting an economic benefit as a reward for 
creative endeavors. -
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and 
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is 
the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 
"Science and the useful Arts." 
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 {1954). 
131. See Peter H. Lewis, Cyberspace Experts Talk 'Revolution' Face to Face, N.Y. TIMEs, 
Aug. 23, 1995, at A9; see also supra note 1. 
132. Similar concerns have led a court to refuse to find liability against a computer infor-
mation service for defamatory statements posted on that service. See CUbby, Inc. v. Compu-
Serve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139-141 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing difficulty of monitoring and 
restriction of public access to information as reasons not to find liability). 
133. See Burk, supra note 7, at 3. 
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that users posted no copyrighted material would negate the benefits 
that bulletin boards offer. 
A contributory copyright infringement analysis which recog-
nizes and accounts for the practical difficulties in monitoring bulle-
tin board use balances these interests. Under such a standard, 
courts would impose liability on operators who run boards with the 
primary purpose of allowing users to distribute copyrighted 
works,134 but not on operators who exercise reasonable control 
over their bulletin boards,135 or who had no reason to know illegal 
conduct was occurring on their boards. 
The court in Playboy v. Frena136 chose to apply a direct infringe-
ment analysis to a computer bulletin board operator to find liability 
for user infringement. The facts on which the court focused in find-
ing direct liability, however, fit readily into this Note's contributory 
copyright infringement framework. The infringing works were 
clearly identified as the works of Playboy, Inc.,137 and there were 
one hundred and seventy photographs copyrighted by Playboy 
available on the board.138 These facts could easily lead to the infer-
ence that the operator of the board had constructive knowledge 
that copyright infringement was occurring. The virtue of this ap-
proach is that it allows courts to hold offending bulletin board oper-
ators liable without casting the net of liability so wide as to 
discourage the operation of all bulletin boards. 
CONCLUSION 
The two cases that discuss the liability of computer bulletin 
board operators for user copyright infringement represent only the 
first of many cases that will address this issue. This Note argues 
that applying a direct infringement approach to this situation is in-
correct for both legal and public policy reasons. Refusing to apply 
direct liability to computer bulletin board operators, however, does 
not mean that copyright owners have no recourse against bulletin 
board operators. The current law provides a framework that allows 
courts to balance the interests of copyright owners, bulletin board 
operators, and society-at-large. A contributory copyright infringe-
ment analysis, sensitive to the practical limitations of an operator's 
ability to monitor user activity, balances these interests and pro-
vides courts with a mechanism to apply liability efficiently, without 
134. See, e.g., Louise Kehoe, supra note 4, at World Trade News 6 (describing a raid on 
thirteen bulletin board operations in Berlin that were distributing software via computer bul-
letin boards). 
135. See, e.g., Meyer & Underwood, supra note 20, at 46. 
136. 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993). 
137. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1559. 
138. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1554. 
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the disadvantages of an inflexible direct infringement approach. 
Th.rough the application of this doctrine, courts will retain the abil-
ity to deal effectively with the quickly developing world of informa-
tion exchange. 
